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This Working Paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Enterprise 
and Innovation. Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the incidence of high technology acquisitions using 
a large international sample of acquisitions by public high technology firms.  
Controlling for firms’ financial characteristics, we examine the impact of the 
following innovation-related factors on the propensity to acquire: R&D-intensity 
as a proxy for R&D inputs; the citation-weighted patent-intensity as a proxy for 
R&D output; the stock of citation-weighted patents as a proxy for the 
accumulated stock of knowledge generated by past R&D efforts.  The following 
conclusions can be drawn with respect to the characteristics of acquirers of non-
public targets – mainly private firms and former subsidiaries.  First, we find 
support for the view that the propensity to acquire new knowledge-related assets 
through acquisitions is driven by declining returns from the exploitation of a 
firm’s existing knowledge base.  Second, we find evidence in favour of the 
make-or-buy theory that acquisitions are a substitute for  in-house R&D activity.  
Third, our results are in accordance with the theoretical argument that a large 
stock of accumulated knowledge enhances a firm’s ability to absorb external 
knowledge through acquisitions.  These results suggest that smaller acquisitions 
can be seen as part of an innovation strategy by acquiring firms with relatively 
low levels of internal R&D which seek to offset low R&D productivity by 
exploring a range of potential innovation trajectories in new and smaller 
business units. Interestingly, we find that these interpretations cannot be made 
for acquirers of the larger public companies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Acquisition activity in the high technology industries
1 of the global economy 
rose dramatically in the last two decades of the 20
th century.  An impression of 
the order of the magnitude of this activity is provided by Inkpen et al. (2000), 
who report that acquisitions by firms in computer- and communication-related 
industries alone accounted for over one-fifth of all US acquisition activity by 
number, and two-fifths by value during the 1990s.  They also report an 
accelerated trend towards such acquisitions, with their share the year-an-a-half 
since January 1998 accounting for nearly 57% of the $1.75 trillion in assets 
acquired in the US.  Almost every multinational corporation engaged in some 
acquisition activity in recent years, with Siemens AG and General Electric Co 
acquiring more than 170 and 110 targets respectively during the eighteen year 
period from 1984 to 2001.   
 
This wave of merger activity has been associated with an increased interest in 
the rationale of high technology acquisitions.  The theories developed in the 
literature to explain the incidence of acquisitions in general, such as the 
realization of synergies arising from economies of scale and scope and market 
power or the elimination of inefficiencies in the market for corporate control and 
the stock market, are relevant to the high technology sector.  They, however, do 
not deal directly with innovation-specific activities rooted in Research & 
Development (R&D) and patenting activity which impact in turn on growth and 
financial performance.   
 
There is, moreover, a growing literature suggesting that firms use acquisitions, 
as well as other forms of corporate venturing, to learn from knowledge sources 
beyond the boundaries of the firm (Veugelers and Cassiman, 1998; Cassiman 
and Veugelers, 2002; Schildt et al., 2003).  More fundamentally, Chesbrough 
(2003) argues that the evidence suggests that we are witnessing a "paradigm 
shift" in the way companies innovate new ideas and bring them to market from 
what he calls “closed innovation” towards “open innovation”.  Although 
according to the former that successful innovation requires control, according to 
the latter companies can and should utilize both external and internal ideas and 
internal and external paths to market to create value.  The seeds of these ideas 
date back to Williamson (1975), who proposed a systems approach of the 
innovation process, stressing the organizational limitations – essentially due to 
bureaucratization – of large firms.  He claims that an efficient outcome can be 
achieved when small firms specialize at the initial development of innovative 
projects, and then large firms acquire these projects possibly through licensing 
or takeover.   
   2
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents one of the most 
comprehensive large-sample studies on the impact of innovative activity on the 
acquisition likelihood.  A major contribution of the study is that it tests 
empirically the view that acquisitions can serve as an alternative to in-house 
R&D, while it also specifies the conditions under which this is more likely to be 
the case by uncovering the particular characteristics of the acquiring firms.   
Furthermore, it accounts, to some extent, for the possibility that acquisitions as a 
whole may represent the aggregation of very different strategic activities 
(Bower, 2001).  Because of an increased awareness that acquisitions of public 
versus private targets might represent a different phenomenon (Ang and Kohers, 
2001; Fuller et al., 2002; Shen and Reuer, 2003; Conn et al, 2005), the analysis 
discriminates between acquisitions of large public firms and those of relatively 
smaller private firms and former subsidiary units, which, as we argue later, are 
likely to serve different needs for the acquiring firms.  It appears that no 
previous empirical study specifically of R&D and innovative activity examines 
the characteristics of firms acquiring private targets and divested units, which 
actually account for the bulk of acquisition activity by numbers. 
 
There are several approaches to R&D and patenting behavior which are relevant 
to our work.  Our theoretical background is developed from three current 
perspectives.  The first perspective is rooted in the distinction between 
explorative and exploitative learning.  The former emphasizes experimentation 
with new alternatives, while the latter emphasizes the refinement and extension 
of existing competencies and technologies (March, 1991).  It is argued that 
acquisitions can be used as an expansion method that enhances exploration and 
helps overcome the inertia and rigidity associated with an emphasis on the 
exploitation of a firm's existing knowledge base through greenfield investment 
(Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001).  The second perspective is based on a 
particular interpretation of the make-or-buy approach, which views managers of 
high-tech firms as choosing between either investing in in-house R&D, or 
sourcing technological knowledge externally through the acquisition of 
innovative firms (Blonigen and Taylor, 2000).  In this case, internal R&D is 
seen as an alternative to external acquisition of technology by takeover.  The 
third perspective is based on the notion of absorptive capacity developed by 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989), which implies that in-house research activity 
enables the firm to develop and maintain its broader capabilities to identify, 
assimilate and exploit knowledge from the environment (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1989).  This line of argument suggests that the accumulated in-house research is 
likely to contribute to the internal knowledge capabilities that allow firms to 
effectively utilize foreign know-how (Arora and Gambardella, 1994), and 
enhances their ability to identify and absorb suitable acquisition targets. 
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On the basis of these arguments, three hypotheses about the innovative 
characteristics of acquiring firms are developed, with the innovative activity 
being measured using data on the inputs of the conduct of R&D (R&D 
expenditure) and its output in the form of intellectual property registered as 
patents.
2  By employing proxies based both on R&D expenditure and patents, 
the analysis accounts not only for the research effort made by firms but also its 
productivity.  The hypotheses are tested using a unique dataset covering a 
maximum of 9,744 acquisitions mainly of public, private and former 
subsidiaries
3 by publicly traded firms in all the major industrial economies 
during the period 1984-2001.  Controlling for the full range of financial 
variables which standard models of takeover behavior link to the propensity to 
acquire (Trahan and Shawky, 1992; Andrade and Stafford, 2000; Blonigen and 
Taylor, 2000; Gugler et al., 2004) we isolate the effect of R&D- and patent-
based characteristics on the propensity to acquire in high technology industries. 
 
This study has further distinctive characteristics compared with previous 
empirical work on acquiring companies.  First, it focuses on high technology 
acquiring firms to ensure that innovation is an important element in corporate 
strategy.  Using aggregate data from a wide cross-section of industries might 
mask a differing relationship between acquisitions and innovative activity that is 
likely to hold between high-tech and non-high-tech firms.  Second, it employs a 
large sample of deals that are rich in geographical and industrial diversity, which 
compares favorably with the samples of previous studies.   
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section develops 
our hypotheses.  This is followed by a section describing the dataset and the 
methodology employed. Then, the empirical results from the analysis and their 
implications for the hypotheses are discussed.  The final section presents the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of this paper.   
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Explorative versus exploitative learning 
This line of argument is anchored in the organizational learning literature.  In a 
seminal paper, March (1991) argues that organizations in order to adapt and 
survive in a changing competitive environment need to allocate their limited 
resources so as to strike a balance between exploration of new alternatives and 
exploitation of existing competencies and technologies.  An interesting 
argument is that, because of organizational factors, power-political incentives 
and the fact that the returns from exploitation tend to be relatively more   4
proximate and predictable, organizations often prefer step-by-step local learning 
over the investigation and adoption of novel alternatives (Schildt et al., 2003; 
March, 1991).  However, the on-going exploitation of the existing knowledge 
and capabilities, even those that make an organization successful in the short-
run, after a point hampers the creation of new knowledge and eventually make 
the organization simple, rigid and unsuccessful (March, 1991; Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2001).  On the one hand, the ongoing exploitation of a firm’s 
technology base is likely to lead to technological exhaustion because most of the 
possible relationships between a set of components have already been tried 
(Fleming, 2001; Kim and Kogut, 1996).  On the other hand, the refinement and 
extension of existing competencies and technologies is likely to trap a firm in 
sub-optimal equilibria (March, 1991).  For instance, successful innovators have 
often found themselves overhauled by challengers with disruptive technologies, 
which, although initially applied to small, emerging and low-growth markets, 
eventually become “mainstream” products (Christensen, 1997).    
 
Along these lines Vermeulen and Barkema (2001) argue that acquisitions can be 
employed as a means of technological renewal and restoring technological 
diversity and of avoiding the inertia and simplicity that results from the repeated 
exploitation of a firm’s knowledge base.  In fact, there is evidence supporting 
the view that acquisitions are often associated with knowledge transfers and 
resource redeployment between the acquirer and the acquired firms (Capron and 
Mitchell, 1998; Bresman et al., 1999).  Also, Capron and Mitchell find that a 
high degree of bilateral resource redeployment of the acquiring and acquired 
firms improves R&D skills, time to market, product quality, product cost and 
output flexibility.   
 
Therefore we expect that, the likelihood of becoming an acquirer will be higher 
the lower the  innovative output of firms relative to their asset base.  This is 
consistent with an enhanced desire to acquire new technology and innovation-
related assets driven by declining returns from the exploitation of the firm’s 
existing asset base.  
 
Hypothesis 1.  Acquiring firms will have a lower innovative output from R&D 
given their asset base than other firms.  
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Make-or-buy  
The task of defining the “efficient boundaries” of a firm and consequently which 
activities should be performed within- and which outside the firm has been 
largely investigated by the transaction cost approach (Williamson, 1975, 1979, 
1981).  In general, R&D activity has two of the characteristics in the presence of 
which the in-house making strategy is the most efficient option.  First, the 
conduct of R&D involves a high degree of uncertainty with respect to the nature, 
the significance and the timing of the research outputs (Arrow, 1962).  Second, 
it often requires transaction-specific investments in not easily redeployable 
assets (e.g. site-, physical- or human capital-specificity) which implies that 
market relationships are subject to the danger of opportunistic behavior by the 
parties involved.  Under these conditions and the rather reasonable behavioral 
assumptions of bounded rationality for at least some of the agents, it is 
impossible, or prohibitively costly (particularly in terms of contract 
enforcement), to write a perfect contract.  As a result, external or quasi-external 
(e.g. licensing or strategic alliances) sourcing of R&D is disfavoured. 
 
However, the make-or-buy dilemma takes a different content once the 
possibility of sourcing technological knowledge through acquisitions of 
innovative firms is accounted for.  Then, as Blonigen and Taylor (2000) put it, 
the make-or-buy theory views managers of high-tech firms as choosing between 
either organic growth with in-house R&D, or external growth through the 
acquisition of technological knowledge, either disembodied or embodied in 
other organizations’ physical or human capital.  This is an external sourcing 
strategy, but the transfer of ownership reduces the dangers of moral hazard once 
the acquisition has been completed. The acquisition of firms with an important 
innovative portfolio or some other external sourcing strategy often is a less risky 
and a faster way of exploiting commercially specific knowledge assets 
(Chakrabarti et al., 1994; Francis and Smith, 1995).  Moreover in the case of 
publicly quoted acquisitions in particular, the acquired company has a track 
record to be analyzed and to make financial projections for future costs and 
expected performance (Hitt et al., 1996).   
 
Although firms, particularly the large ones, are likely to follow a mixture of 
sourcing strategies and adopt a spectrum of activities (Veugelers and Cassiman, 
1998; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), there are reasons to expect some kind of 
substitutability between in-house R&D and external sourcing of knowledge 
through acquisitions.  First, it is argued that, because firms have a limited pool 
of financial resources available, a trade-off is likely to exist between investments 
in acquisitions and investments in other areas, such as R&D (Hitt et al., 1991).  
Second, because acquisitions require substantial financial resources, which are   6
often covered by excessive amounts of debt, acquiring firms’ financial risk 
increases (Hitt et al. 1990).  As a result, managers themselves or risk-averse debt 
holders with an influence over the firm’s management are then more likely to 
avoid risky investments with long-horizon payback periods, like R&D (Smith 
and Warner, 1979).  Therefore, on the basis of this approach we expect that 
external acquisition of technology by takeover is a substitute for internal R&D. 
Since R&D is positively related to business size we express our  hypothesis in   
size relative form. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Acquiring firms will have a lower level of R&D inputs than other 
firms of a given size. 
 
Absorptive capacity 
According to Cohen and Levinthal (1989), R&D activity has a dual role.  Firms 
invest in R&D not only in order to innovate, but also to develop and maintain 
their broader capabilities to identify, assimilate and use knowledge from the 
environment.  In other words, one of the reasons that firms engage in R&D is to 
develop what Cohen and Levinthal call “absorptive capacity”.  In that sense, in-
house research contributes to the internal knowledge capabilities that allow 
firms to effectively utilize external know-how (Arora and Gambardella, 1994).  
Similarly, Chesbrough (2003) stresses the importance of continued internal 
capacities and capabilities even while integrating external R&D.  On this view, 
R&D and acquisitions of innovating firms can be viewed as complementary 
strategies, in the sense that the benefits from acquisitions of innovating firms are 
increased by the acquirer’s own past research efforts.  This line of reasoning also 
explains why some firms spend on basic research, which is unlikely to lead to 
directly commercially exploitable results.  Thus, despite a trade-off for current 
expenditures between in-house activities and external acquisition, the likelihood 
of making acquisitions will be enhanced by past internal capacity development.  
This ensures that the acquired businesses will be effectively managed and their 
innovative potential fully utilized.  Therefore, we expect that, controlling for 
current R&D, the likelihood of becoming an acquirer is positively associated 
with the stock of accumulated knowledge generated by past R&D efforts. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Acquiring firms will tend to have a large stock of accumulated 
knowledge generated by past R&D efforts relative to other firms. 
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Public versus non-public targets 
Although the empirical literature on mergers and acquisitions has until recently 
focused on acquisitions involving publicly traded firms, the volume of privately 
held targets and former subsidiary units acquired has surpassed that of publicly 
traded targets (Ang and Kohers, 2001).  Acquisitions of public targets tend to be 
the deals with the largest transaction value and those that receive the most 
extensive coverage by the financial press.  The largest domestic – but overall the 
second largest – high technology deal during the period 1984-2000, is the 
merger announced in 2000 between the US firms America Online Inc and Time 
Warner in a transaction valued at $180.18 billion.
4  The largest high-tech deal 
during the period 1984-2001 – and actually the largest ever deal across all the 
industries – is the cross-border acquisition of the German firm Mannesmann AG 
by the UK-based firm Vodafone AirTouch PLC in a transaction valued at 
$216.78 billion, which was announced in 2000.  However, apart from a handful 
of mega-deals taking place every year, the vast majority of deals involve small, 
mostly private, firms.  Our calculations based on the population of high-tech 
deals announced during the period 1984-2001 and reported by Thomson’s 
Financial SDC, suggest that more than half of the deals have a value of less than 
$25m, and only about 4% of all deals are between $1 and $10 billion, while just 
0.5% of all the deals are valued at more than $10 billion.   
 
The inclusion of acquisitions of private targets and subsidiaries in the analysis of 
this paper is an important contribution to the literature.  We suspect that the 
innovation-related hypotheses set out above are likely to hold more strongly for 
acquisitions of privately held targets and former subsidiaries divested by their 
previous parent compared to acquisitions of publicly traded targets.  This is in 
accordance with Williamson (1975) who claims that no single size or form of 
organization has optimum properties with respect to all stages of the innovation 
process, from invention, to experimental development, to market testing, to 
commercial production and finally to distribution.  The relative strengths of 
small firms are their behavioral characteristics, while those of large firms lie 
mostly in resources.  He suggests that efficiency requires that the initial 
development and market testing to be performed by independent inventors and 
small firms (perhaps new entrants) in an industry, the successful developments 
then to be acquired, possibly through licensing or takeover, for subsequent 
marketing by a large multidivisional enterprise.   
 
The best known and successful high-tech acquisition strategies in the decades 
covered by our sample involved persistent acquisitions of small highly 
innovative companies by Cisco Systems, a leader in the computer equipment 
market.  These acquisitions were explicitly seen as primarily offering   8
opportunities for access to new technologies, entry into new markets and growth 
(Holloway et al., 2004).  Cisco’s innovation strategy is often compared with that 
of its (approximate) competitor, Lucent Technologies (Chesbrough, 2003).  The 
former did little internal research and put more effort in scanning the world of 
start-ups that were commercializing new products and services and either 
partnered with them or acquired.  The latter, despite an acquisition activity that 
should not be disregarded, emphasized on in-house investments that were 
directed to exploring the world of new material, state-of-the-art components and 
systems, and it targeted at new fundamental discoveries. 
 
As far as the acquired firms’ incentives for sale are concerned, the evidence 
suggest that a high innovative and growth potential of small private firms is 
often under-utilized (Oakey, 1995; Hughes, 1998).  This is due to market 
failures affecting their access to finance and limitations based on recruiting 
expanded managerial and directorial talent or a lack of some complementary 
assets and capabilities that play a crucial role in the innovative process or the 
successful commercialization of their products.  Such factors can be continuous 
R&D, large-scale production, technological, market and product expertise, 
linkages with universities and research institutions, legal expertise in patent-
related issues.  In the case of acquisitions of subsidiaries, their previous parent 
firms often divest them if they require substantial R&D and capital investments 
that the parent firms are unable or unwilling to make, particularly when these 
units no longer fall inside their parent firm’s core activities (Weston et al., 1998; 
Parhankangas and Arenius, 2003). Smaller acquisitions are therefore an obvious 
part of an innovation strategy for firms with relatively low levels of internal 
R&D which seek to offset low productivity in exploiting past R&D efforts by 
exploring a range of potential future innovation trajectories in new and smaller 
businesses. 
 
In the case of larger public acquisitions other factors may come into play 
alongside the hypotheses we have set out in this section. These include broader 
strategies to rationalize and reorganize R&D investment programs by firms 
which are already highly R&D intensive and are related to gaining scale and 
scope economies in their innovation input activities, rather than a response to 
declining returns on past programs. We therefore carry out our analysis for our 
sample as a whole and disaggregated into public and non-public targets.   9
METHODS 
The data 
Acquisitions are defined as deals where the acquiring firm owns less than 50% 
of target’s voting shares before the takeover and increases its ownership to at 
least 50% as a result of the takeover.  Furthermore, high technology acquisitions 
are defined as those involving acquiring firms with some part of their activity in 
one of the high-tech industries specified by Hall and Vopel (1996), and whose 
primary activity
5 is in SIC 28 Chemicals and Allied Products, SIC 35 Industrial 
and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment, SIC 36 Electronics and 
Electrical Equipment, SIC 37 Transportation Equipment, SIC 38 Measuring, 
Analyzing and Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical and Optical 
Goods, SIC 48 Communications, SIC 73 Business Services, SIC 87 
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, and Related Services.
6  We 
focus on acquisitions carried out by publicly traded firms and which involve 
firms operating in one of the ten most merger-active industrialized countries, 
namely Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK, and the US.
7  The population of acquisitions comes from 
Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum, which reports 14,016 completed deals 
announced during the period from January 1984 to June 2001.  These deals are 




The innovative activity of firms is measured using data on the inputs of the 
conduct of R&D (R&D expenditure) and its output in the form of intellectual 
property registered as patents.  However, because the distribution of the value of 
patented innovations is extremely skewed (Scherer 1997), we also consider for 
each patent the number of forward citations it receives by subsequent patents to 
approximate its value.  A patent which is cited many times is more likely to be 
highly valued than a patent which is relatively rarely cited (Griliches, 1990). 
 
Financial data and data on R&D expenditure for the period 1983-2001 were 
collected from Datastream, Compustat and Global Vantage.  Data on patent 
counts and patent citations
9 were collected from the NBER dataset which 
includes all the utility patents granted by the US Patent and Trade Office 
(USPTO) with our series covering the period from 1983 until 1999 and 1997 
respectively (Hall et al., 2001).
10  Moreover, because firms often register patents 
under their subsidiaries’ names (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2000), we used Dun & 
Bradstreet’s “Who owns whom” annual issues to obtain their detailed corporate 
structure and data were aggregated at the parent firm level.  Combining these 
databases we construct a unique unbalanced panel dataset covering the period   10
1983-2001 which consists of financial and innovation-related variables on 
13,075 firms, including both acquiring and non- acquiring firms. 
 
The sample over which the financial characteristics and R&D-intensity of the 
acquiring firms are examined is reduced to 9,744 acquisitions (1,398 public and 
8,346 non-public targets) initiated by 2,276 firms, after imposing the restriction 
that data are available for acquiring firms, at least on some key financial 
variables
11 in the last pre-merger year.  The patent- and citation-weighted patent-
based characteristics of acquiring firms can only be assessed on the basis of a 
sample of 6,413 and 5,064 acquisitions initiated by 1,166 and 1,074 acquiring 
firms, respectively.  This is because, on the one hand, only a subset of acquirers 
is linked to patent assignees at the USPTO, and on the other hand, our patent 
and citation data end in 1999 and 1997, respectively.   
 
The fall in the size of the sample of acquiring firms over which the pre-merger 
firm characteristics are assessed introduces some sample selection bias towards 
larger firms.  While the overall median size (ln total assets measured in $1996 
thousands) of all acquiring firms equals 12.32, the median size of the 9,744 
acquiring firms over which the pre-merger financial characteristics and R&D-
intensity are assessed equals 12.50.  The bias is more serious for the sample of 
firms over which their patent-based characteristics are assessed, where the 
median size of the 6,413 acquiring firms equals 12.89.  This larger size 
imbalance arises from the fact that the firms linked to patent assignees tend to be 
relatively larger compared with those not linked. 
 
The model 
The probability of making an acquisition is modeled as a function of key firm 
characteristics, using an unbalanced panel dataset which consists of financial 
and innovation-related variables on both acquiring and non-acquiring firms for 
which data are available in some years during the period 1983-2001.   
 
We employ a logit and a negative binomial maximum likelihood model (See the 
Appendix) to estimate the acquisition probabilities, since the takeover incidence 
in a given year takes strictly non-negative values and hence the classical linear 
model is inadequate.
12  Similar estimation methods have been used in previous 
empirical work.
13  The logit model is very attractive due to its simplicity, but it 
has the drawback that, because it is a binary response model, it treats similarly 
firms that undertake a single or multiple acquisitions in a given year.  The 
negative binomial maximum likelihood model tackles this drawback, where the 
dependent variable is the number of acquisitions made by each firm in a given   11
year.  For both models we assume that merger events are independent 
conditional on the regressors.
14   
 
Given the cross-section and time series nature of our dataset, panel data 
estimation methods have the advantage that they allow us to account for some 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms (Hsiao, 1986).  With respect to the choice 
between fixed- and random-effects, we prefer the random effects approach 
because the number of firms over which the fixed-effects models is estimated is 
much lower. This is because the fixed-effects estimator procedure requires some 
variation in the outcome for each firm across time, and considers only firms for 
which data on regressors are available for more than a single year.  We also 
employ the simple logit estimator that pools together observations across firms 
and years.  It has the advantage of being simple to calculate, and it is expected to 
lead to comparable estimates to those of the random-effects estimator if the 
variance contributed by the panel-level component is small relative to the total 
variance.  Robust standard errors to within-firm serial correlation are calculated 
for the simple logit estimates, since even if firm-specific effects are uncorrelated 
with the regressors, the composite errors might be serially correlated due to the 
presence of a firm-specific effect in each time period.   
 
Independent variables and controls affecting the acquisition probability 
Innovation-related characteristics 
The innovative profile of firms is examined with respect to their R&D inputs, 
R&D output, and the stock of accumulated knowledge generated by past R&D 
efforts.  Because of the large size differences across firms and the size difference 
caused by acquisitions, R&D inputs, proxied by R&D expenditure, and R&D 
output, proxied by the number of successful patent applications, are normalized 
by firm size (See, for example, Blonigen and Taylor, 2000; Hall, 1999; Hitt et 
al., 1991).  Therefore, R&D inputs are defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure 
to total assets and we refer to this ratio as R&D-intensity.
15  R&D output is 
defined as the ratio of the number of successful patent applications to $million 
of total assets and we refer to this ratio as patent-intensity.  The stock of 
accumulated knowledge generated by past R&D efforts is measured by the stock 
of patents
16, which is calculated by the standard perpetual inventory formula 
assuming a 15% depreciation rate per annum (See Hall, 1990).  R&D output and 
the patent stock are also calculated using the number of normalized citations 
received by forward patents (instead of the raw patent count) to account not only 
for the quantity but also the quality of the patented inventions.  The 
disadvantage of citation-weighted patent measures is that the citation data end in 
1997.   12
Controlling for financial characteristics 
Although the issue of primary interest is the innovative profile of merging firms, 
this is investigated in the light of their financial profile.  This is because, 
financial variables are likely to influence both their innovative and acquisition 
activity.  The initial set of characteristics that were considered as controls to 
model the acquisition probability consists of firm size, indicators of economic 
performance and of the availability of financial resources.  The evidence from 
previous innovation-based studies is that the acquisition probability tends to be 
positively related to firm size, economic performance and internal financial 
resources (Hall, 1988, 1999; Blonigen and Taylor, 2000).  All financial variables 
are expressed in constant 1996 prices using the US GDP deflator, which 
effectively averages how consumers, producers and the public sector experience 
inflation.  
 
Firm size is proxied by the book value of total assets.  We have chosen this 
specific size measure, because it has the best coverage among all the alternatives 
considered (sales, number of employees, net assets).  Recent studies employing 
a similar size proxy include Powell (1997), Blonigen and Taylor (2000).   
 
The economic performance is proxied by three variables.  First, firm growth, 
which is calculated as the annual growth of total assets.  Second, profitability, 
which is proxied by operating return and is calculated as the ratio of earnings 
before interest taxation, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets.  
Third, Tobin’s q, which we approximate by  calculating the ratio of total assets 
plus the market value of common equity minus the book value of common 
equity to total assets (See Blanchard et al., 1994; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; 
Andrade and Stafford, 2000) 
17. This performance measure has the advantage 
over the previous two accounting performance measures that, being a (quasi) 
market-based indicator, it is forward-looking in nature.  According to the q-
theory of investment, whenever the rate of return on a firm’s current capital 
stock exceeds its cost of capital, q exceeds unity and the firm is expanding its 
capital stock (Gugler et al., 2004).  Therefore, q can be viewed as an indicator of 
a firm’s growth opportunities.   
 
The financial status of firms is proxied by the cash flow ratio, leverage and 
liquidity.  The cash flow ratio is employed to proxy for the amount of funds 
available to a firm for operations, investment and acquisitions.  It might be an 
important determinant of the choice between internal R&D or acquisition of 
innovative firms, given the arguments that R&D is primarily financed by 
internally generated resources (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994).  It is defined 
as the ratio of income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and   13
amortization to total assets.  Leverage, which is employed as a proxy of a firm’s 
capital structure, reflects the financial risk faced by a firm which might limit 
managers’ ability to allocate adequate resources to R&D activity (Smith and 
Warner, 1979).  It is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt to the book value 
of common equity.  Finally, liquidity, which measures a firm’s ability to meet its 
short-term obligations from its current assets, is calculated as the ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities. 
 
Model specification 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables.
18  It 
is interesting to notice that firm size and its stock of accumulated knowledge 
((citation-weighted) patent stock) are not particularly correlated, and that there is 
a high correlation between operating return and the cash flow ratio.  To avoid 
possible multicollinearity bias, the latter is excluded from the specifications 
estimated.  The rather counterintuitive negative correlation coefficient between 
Tobin’s q and operating returns is found to be due to the effect of some 
observations with negative operating return, and we actually obtain a positive 
correlation coefficient (0.39) for observations with non-negative operating 




Table 1. Descriptive statistics & correlations, max 53,913 observations on 6,428 firms, 1983-2001 




Dev.  Min  Max  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13 
1  Total Assets (ln)  53,913  11.637  11.547 2.240  5.114  17.529 1.00              
2  Total Assets Growth  53,913  0.359  0.055  1.488  -0.782 15.083 -0.04  1.00             
3 Operating  Return  53,913  -0.021  0.085  0.488  -4.858 0.539  0.37 0.00 1.00            
4  Tobin's q (ln)  53,913  0.583  0.410  0.734  -0.853 3.779  -0.25  0.16  -0.31  1.00           
5  Cash Flow Ratio  53,708  -0.067  0.050  0.508  -5.211 0.387  0.36  0.01  0.96  -0.32  1.00          
6 Leverage  53,913  0.615  0.249  2.452  -14.957 22.605 0.14 -0.01 0.05 -0.10 0.05 1.00         
7  Liquidity  53,913  3.067 1.894 3.997 0.046  36.217 -0.18  0.26  -0.01  0.14  0.00  -0.09  1.00        
8  R&D-intensity  (un-adjusted)  46,724  0.088 0.031 0.175 0.000 1.784 -0.36 -0.01 -0.63  0.40  -0.62  -0.10 0.10 1.00       
9  R&D-intensity    53,913  0.076 0.018 0.165 0.000 1.784 -0.32 -0.01 -0.57  0.38  -0.56  -0.09 0.10 1.00 1.00      
10 Patent  Stock  (ln)  18,755  0.378 1.486 4.617 -9.210 7.698  0.39  -0.06  0.04  0.01  0.04  -0.01 -0.07  0.02  0.04  1.00     
11  Cite-weighted Patent Stock (ln)  15,652  -0.113  1.507  5.153  -9.210 7.671  0.38  -0.06  0.06  0.00  0.06  -0.02  -0.07  0.01  0.03  0.95 1.00    
12  Patent-intensity  18,755  0.027  0.000  0.098  0.000  1.298  -0.23 0.06 -0.23 0.23 -0.20 -0.05 0.12 0.28 0.28 0.13 0.15 1.00   
13  Cite-weighted  Patent-intensity  15,652  0.040  0.000  0.175  0.000  2.237  -0.20 0.07 -0.19 0.22 -0.18 -0.04 0.09 0.25 0.25 0.11 0.15  0.73 1.00 
ln indicates the natural logarithm.  Total Assets are measured in $1996 thousands.  R&D-intensity is reported both un-adjusted and adjusted where missing observations are assumed to be zero if data on all the 
financial variables considered are available (this adjustment excludes German firms).  Correlations with absolute value exceeding 0.50 are highlighted.   15
Because patent data are not available for a large number of firms, estimating a 
single regression, including all the independent variables, would introduce a 
serious bias against smaller firms and would lead to a dramatic reduction of 
firm-year observations.  To overcome this problem, we adopted two 
complementary model specifications, and the robustness of our findings is 
examined by estimating a specification including all the independent variables 
together.  The first one models the probability of making acquisitions as a 
function of some key financial characteristics (total assets, total asset growth, 
operating return, Tobin’s q, leverage and liquidity) and R&D-intensity.  The 
second one models the same probabilities as a function of a subset of financial 
characteristics (total assets, total asset growth and operating return), R&D-
intensity, the stock of patents or citation-weighted patents, and patent-intensity 
or citation-weighted patent-intensity
19.  Although measures based on citation-
weighted patent-intensity are likely to be better proxies of the importance of 
innovation output, we also consider measures based on raw patent counts, as this 
allows a larger sample size, since our citation data end in 1997.   
 
The econometric models are estimated over the completed acquisitions during 
the period 1984-2002 that involve firms with the appropriate data.  All 
covariates have been lagged by one year so as to avoid endogeneity problems 
and possible biases arising from different merger accounting methods and 
financial statement consolidation.
20  Country, industry and time dummy 
variables are included in the estimated specifications to account for the 
possibility of time or cross-sectional dependence of acquisitions.
21  Because we 
find evidence for the existence of some influential outliers, data are winsorized 
at 1% (0.5% from each side).  To account for other idiosyncrasies (skewedness, 
missing observations, non-linearity) of some of the variables some additional 
adjustments have been adopted.
22  First, similar to Hall (1999), a dummy 
variable is employed for very negative operating returns, that is for EBITDA 
losses of more than half the firm’s total assets, in which case the continuous 
variable is set to zero.  Second, following the practice of previous studies (e.g. 
Hall, 1999) a dummy variable is employed for missing R&D values which 
equals one when R&D is missing and R&D-intensity is set equal to zero.
23  
Third, a dummy is employed for firms with zero (citation-weighted) patent-
intensity, to distinguish between firms with some versus no R&D output.
24 
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RESULTS 
 
Panel A of Table 2 provides the estimated coefficients for the simple logit, the 
random-effects logit and the random-effects negative binomial models.  As can 
be seen from the random-effects logit and negative binomial models, the 
likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that the panel-level variance 
component
25 is unimportant is rejected at the 5% significance level.
26  Yet, the 
estimates and the corresponding standard errors from the three models are quite 
close.  In all three models, the estimates are based on 53,913 observations of 
6,428 firms and a total of 9,744 acquisitions by 2,276 acquiring firms.  Let us 
start from the random-effects logit model.  Employing the Wald test, we reject 
the null hypothesis that the slope parameters of the model are jointly zero.  The 
coefficients of most of the year, country and industry dummies are individually 
significant, and together jointly significant according to a likelihood ratio test.  
In addition the hypothesis that the firm characteristics employed as regressors do 
not add anything to the explanatory power of our model over the year, country 
and industry dummies is rejected by a likelihood ratio test.  The estimated 
coefficients suggest that the probability of making acquisitions is statistically 
significantly positively related to total assets, total asset growth, operating 
return, and Tobin’s q, while it is significantly negatively related to R&D-
intensity.     17
Table 2. Regressions for estimating the probability of making acquisitions 
Panel A. Financial variables and R&D-intensity 
 
Regressor  Logit  Logit Random Effects 
Negative Binomial 
Random Effects 
Constant -11.190*  -12.540*  -8.785* 
 (0.418)  (0.427)  (0.396) 
Total Assets (ln)  0.396*  0.431*  0.346* 
 (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.011) 
Total Assets Growth  0.060*  0.049*  0.038* 
 (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.008) 
Op. Return  0.815*  1.180*  0.980* 
 (0.141)  (0.147)  (0.117) 
Dummy Op. Return Negative  0.143  0.080  0.038 
 (0.103)  (0.110)  (0.093) 
Tobin's q (ln)  0.350*  0.461*  0.397* 
 (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.024) 
Leverage -0.001  -0.002  -0.002 
 (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.005) 
Liquidity -0.004  0.004  0.006 
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
R&D-intensity -0.725*  -0.743*  -0.638* 
 (0.224)  (0.217)  (0.183) 
Dummy No R&D  0.008  0.062  0.100** 
 (0.073)  (0.076)  (0.059) 
Country, Industry & Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No of Observations  53,913  53,913  53,913 
No of Firms  6,428  6,428  6,428 
No of Acquisitions  9,744  9,744  9,744 
Wald Test   2,397.9  2,511.4  32,91.4 
Degrees of Freedom  44  44  44 
P-value 0.0  0.0  0.0 
Log Likelihood  -15,275.7  -14,255.2  -20,101.3 
Likelihood Ratio Test of Rho    2,041.0  2,573.2 
P-value   0.0  0.0 
Pseudo R-squared  0.18     
* (**) Indicates a significant coefficient at 5% (10%) level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Robust standard errors to within-firm serial 
correlation are reported for the logit model.  ln indicates the natural logarithm.  Total Assets are measured in $1996 thousands.  The 
regressions include firms from Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, the UK and the US.  The 
base country is the US, the base industry SIC 283 and the base year 2002.   
   18
Similar results are obtained by the negative binomial model. The only difference 
is that, in addition to the negative relationship between R&D-intensity and the 
takeover probability, we also obtain a significantly positive coefficient of the 
dummy for firms when R&D expenditure is not reported, which are expected to 
have zero or low R&D-intensity.   
 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the results for the patent-based regressions (first 
three columns) and the citation-weighted patent-based regressions (last three 
columns). Again, the panel-level variation, for both the logit and the negative 
binomial models, is found to be important and hence the random-effects models 
are discussed.
27  With respect to the patent-based specifications, patent data 
availability restrictions lead to a total of 24,466 observations on 2,619 firms and 
6,413 acquisitions by 1,166 acquiring firms.  For both models, we find that the 
firm characteristics employed as regressors are jointly different from zero.  Also, 
the country, industry and year dummies are jointly significant.  As was the case 
with Panel A, we find that the acquisition probability is positively related to total 
assets, total asset growth, operating return, and negatively related to R&D-
intensity.  The acquisition probability is also positively related to the size of a 
firm’s stock of accumulated knowledge (stock of patents), while we find a 
significantly negative coefficient of the dummy for zero patent-intensity for the 
negative binomial model.
28  Therefore, acquiring firms tend to have a rich record 
of accumulated knowledge and they are more likely to have non-zero R&D 
output in the year before acquisitions.  
   19
Table 2, Panel B. Financial variables, R&D-intensity and patent-related variables 
 














Constant -5.734*  -6.641*  -3.252*  -5.462*  -6.330*  -3.101* 
 (0.306)  (0.315)  (0.247)  (0.326)  (0.324)  (0.269) 
Total Assets (ln)  0.356*  0.395*  0.312*  0.340*  0.381*  0.309* 
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.017) 
Total Assets Growth  0.075*  0.058*  0.050*  0.076*  0.052*  0.041* 
 (0.016)  (0.02)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.017) 
Op.  Return    1.724* 2.171*  1.776* 1.527*  1.972* 1.662* 
 (0.202)  (0.2)  (0.153)  (0.218)  (0.221)  (0.174) 
Dummy  Op.  Return  Negative  0.011 -0.107 -0.124 0.145 0.028 -0.005 
 (0.148)  (0.163)  (0.141)  (0.166)  (0.183)  (0.157) 
R&D-intensity  -0.675* -0.538**  -0.556* -0.667** -0.498  -0.464 
 (0.316)  (0.295)  (0.248)  (0.345)  (0.341)  (0.284) 
Dummy  No  R&D  -0.116 -0.158  -0.106 -0.061  -0.1  -0.054 
 (0.109)  (0.111)  (0.084)  (0.116)  (0.118)  (0.09) 
Patent Stock (ln)  0.038*  0.048*  0.035*       
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.007)       
Patent-intensity -0.457  -0.135  -0.17       
 (0.346)  (0.356)  (0.31)       
Dummy Zero Patent-intensity  -0.165*  -0.08  -0.094**       
 (0.068)  (0.07)  (0.051)       
Citation-wtd Patent Stock (ln)        0.028*  0.034*  0.022* 
       (0.01)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
Citation-wtd Patent-intensity        -0.540*  -0.355  -0.324** 
       (0.228)  (0.221)  (0.193) 
Dummy Zero Cit.-wtd Patent-intensity        -0.230*  -0.162*  -0.147* 
       (0.072)  (0.076)  (0.056) 
Country, Industry &Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No of Observations  24,466  24,466  24,466  20,940  20,940  20,940 
No of Firms  2,619  2,619  2,619  2,462  2,462  2,462 
No of Acquisitions  6,413  6,413  6,413  5,064  5,064  5,064 
Wald Test   1,561.7  1,586.8  1,993.9  1,344.6  1,338.2  1,713.5 
Degrees of Freedom  42  42  42  39  39  39 
P-value  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Log Likelihood  -8,509.4  -8,046.5  -11,834.8  -7,225.3  -6,848.8  -9,822.6 
Likelihood Ratio Test of Rho    925.7  1,352.7    753.1  1,053.8 
P-value   0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0 
Pseudo R-squared  0.20      0.19     
In the patent-based regressions the base industry is SIC 283 and the base year is 2000.  In the citation-weighted patent-based regressions the 
base industry is SIC 283 and the base year is 1998.  In all the regressions the base country is the US.  See notes to Panel A.   20
In relation to the citation-weighted patent-based models, data availability 
restrictions further reduce the sample size to 20,940 observations on 2,464 firms 
and 5,064 acquisitions by 1,074 acquiring firms.  The financial characteristics of 
firms are similar to the ones described above, while the coefficient on R&D-
intensity is still negative, but it becomes insignificant in the random effect 
models.
29  Apart from obtaining in both the random-effects logit and the 
negative binomial models a significantly positive coefficient for the citation-
weighted patent stock and a significantly negative coefficient for zero citation-
weighted patent-intensity, the results from the latter (and the simple logit) also 
suggest that acquiring firms are more likely to have significantly lower citation-
weighted patent-intensity before acquisitions.   
 
Taking these findings altogether, we conclude that acquiring firms tend to be 
relatively large and dynamic firms with high profitability and good growth 
prospects (Tobin’s q).  In relation to their innovative profile, they tend to have a 
large stock of accumulated knowledge and a rather low R&D-intensity.  They 
are also more likely to be firms with at least some R&D output, but overall it 
seems that they are more likely to have a low R&D output (citation-weighted 
patent-intensity).  Given that we have controlled for size and R&D-intensity, the 
low R&D output of acquiring firms is likely to reflect a low R&D productivity.  
Therefore, although acquiring firms have a large accumulated stock of patents, 
they appear to experience either a low number of patents generated per dollar 
expensed in R&D, and/or relatively low-valued patents in terms of the number 
of forward citations they receive before acquisitions. 
 
Also in a separate analysis not tabulated here we investigate the importance of 
year, country and industry effects on the basis of the dummy variables from the 
random-effects logit model of Table 2, Panel A.  The probability peaks in the 
mid-1980s, the late-1980s and the late-1990s.
30  Interestingly, these trends 
follow closely the world stock market fluctuations which were computed using a 
weighted stock price index from some 38 countries that is provided by 
Datastream.  This suggests that the acquisition probability is correlated with 
stock market movements (See Nelson, 1959; Shleifer & Vishny, 2001).  As far 
as the location of a firm is concerned, Canadian and British firms appear to be 
the most acquisition-intensive firms, after US firms, while Japanese firms are by 
far the least acquisition-intensive firms.  These results are in accordance with the 
general distinction between firms in market-insider systems and market-outsider 
systems (See Franks and Mayer, 1995; Mayer, 1998).  Finally, it appears that 
among the engineering firms (SIC 35, 36, 38, 48), those in SIC 36 are the most 
likely and those in SIC 37 the least likely to be active in acquisitions.
31   
   21
Further Investigation 
Given the remarkable diversity of acquiring firms and their targets, we 
investigate the robustness of the relationships established above.  In particular, 
we suspect that there might exist significant differences between acquirers of 
public versus non-public
32 targets (See the theoretical section).  If this is the 
case, pooling across public and non-public acquisitions might camouflage 
important differences in acquirers’ characteristics.  To investigate this 
dimension, we employ a multinomial logit model, which is a generalization of 
the logit model (See Greene, 1997, Chapter 19).  The dependent variable takes 
on three different values, depending on whether a firm makes no acquisitions in 
a year, acquires at least one public target
33, or acquires non-public targets only.  
The results shown in Table 3 are reported in terms of marginal effects evaluated 
at the averages of the regressors, since in multinomial logit models the direction 
of the effect of each regressor cannot be assessed simply by the sign of its 
estimated coefficient (See Greene, 1997, Chapter 19).   
 
We focus our attention on the regressions of Panels A and B including firms 
from all the countries.
34  The results suggest that both groups of acquiring firms 
tend to be relatively larger, more dynamic, to have higher q ratios, and probably 
higher profitability.
35  However, only the firms acquiring non-public targets 
seem to have a statistically significantly different innovative profile from non-
acquiring firms.  More precisely, they tend to have relatively lower R&D-
intensity, a larger stock of accumulated citation-weighted patents, and although 
they tend to have non-zero R&D output (citation-weighted patent-intensity), 
they are more likely to have a relatively lower level of R&D output.     22
Table 3. Multinomial logit regressions: the probability of making acquisitions of public and non-public 
targets (marginal effects) 
 
Panel A. Financial variables and R&D-intensity 
 All  US  UK  Other 
Regressor  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Constant  -0.2968* -0.1182* -0.3139* -0.1830* -0.7355*  -2.13E-02* -0.1148*  -1.40E-02*
  (0.0125) (0.0059) (0.0166) (0.0088) (0.0681)  (3.83E-03)  (0.0102)  (3.00E-03) 
Total Assets (ln)  0.0031*  0.0051*  0.0029*  0.0081*  0.0092*  3.93E-04*  0.0019*  2.85E-04* 
  (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0014)  (7.78E-05)  (0.0002)  (5.79E-05) 
Total Assets Growth  0.0005*  0.0005*  0.0006*  0.0007*  0.0007  6.60E-05*  0.0004*  5.16E-05* 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0009)  (3.36E-05)  (0.0001)  (2.44E-05) 
Op.  Return  0.0083* 0.0032 0.0105* 0.0047  0.0062  3.34E-04  0.0034**  2.75E-04 
  (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0038) (0.0117)  (5.62E-04)  (0.0019)  (4.02E-04) 
Dummy Op. Return Negative  0.0012  0.002  0.001  0.0032  -0.0052  -9.31E-05  0.0013  1.79E-04 
  (0.001) (0.0019)  (0.0012)  (0.0031) (0.011)  (7.57E-04)  (0.0015)  (3.36E-04) 
Tobin's q (ln)  0.0025*  0.0048*  0.0021*  0.0070*  0.0138*  6.69E-04*  0.0015*  1.67E-04* 
  (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0026)  (1.51E-04)  (0.0004)  (8.41E-05) 
Leverage  3.14E-05  -0.0001  0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0007** -1.28E-05  -0.0002* -2.68E-05*
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004)  (3.45E-05)  (0.0001)  (1.02E-05) 
Liquidity  -3.33E-05  -1.85E-05 -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001 -1.65E-05  2.40E-06 1.08E-05 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0008)  (3.63E-05)  (0.0001)  (9.05E-06) 
R&D-intensity  -0.0079* -0.0001 -0.0108* -0.0008  -0.0009 5.15E-04 0.0031 -4.55E-04 
  (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0045) (0.0232)  (9.58E-04)  (0.0024)  (6.05E-04) 
Dummy No R&D  0.0002  -0.0007  -0.0011  -0.0023  0.009  9.73E-04** 0.0015  -6.74E-06 
  (0.0007) (0.001) (0.0008)  (0.0017) (0.015)  (5.26E-04)  (0.0009)  (1.30E-04) 
Country  dummies  Yes  No  No  Yes  
Industry  &  Year  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No  of  Observations  53,913  31,414   7,680   14,819  
No  of  Acquisitions  9,744  7,223  1,386  1,135  
Chi-squared  2,485.7  1,862.0   299.1    395.6   
Degrees  of  Freedom  86  68  68  82  
P-value  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Log  Likelihood  -17,840.2    -12,484.9   -2,520.2  -2,585.0  
Pseudo  R-squared  0.18  0.16  0.17  0.22  
(1)  refers to the probability of acquiring non-public targets only, (2) refers to the probability of acquiring at least one public target.  “Other”  regression 
includes firms from Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland.  The base industry is SIC 283 and the base year 
is 2002.  In the first two columns the base country is the US, and in the last two columns it is Canada.  See notes to Table 2, Panel A.   23
Table 3, Panel B. Financial variables, R&D-intensity and patent-related variables 
 All  US  UK  Other 
Regressor  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Constant  -0.3278* -0.1020* -0.3794* -0.1340* -0.6957*  -2.70E-07  -0.0795*  -1.89E-05*
  (0.0259) (0.009) (0.0318)  (0.0114)  (0.2809)  (2.43E-07) (0.0162)  (7.49E-06)
Total Assets (ln)  0.0207*  0.0059*  0.0238*  0.0077*  0.0463*  1.71E-08  0.0052*  1.01E-06*
  (0.0017) (0.0005) (0.0021) (0.0007) (0.0185)  (1.76E-08) (0.0012)  (4.04E-07)
Total Assets Growth  0.0043*  0.0010*  0.0048*  0.0013*  0.0186*  4.49E-09  0.0004  7.46E-08 
  (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0085)  (8.53E-09) (0.0014)  (2.86E-07)
Op. Return   0.1033*  0.0216*  0.1335*  0.0299*  0.0954  -3.67E-08  0.0086  2.12E-06 
  (0.0156) (0.005) (0.0196)  (0.0066)  (0.2184)  (1.69E-07) (0.0111)  (3.78E-06)
Dummy Op. Return Negative  0.0114  0.0021  0.0079  0.0027  -3.4909*  -1.57E-06* 0.0074  -6.40E-05*
  (0.0118) (0.0052) (0.0149)  (0.007)  (0.641)  (6.18E-07) (0.0096)  (2.11E-05)
R&D-intensity  -0.0882* -0.0007 -0.1178* -0.0004  -0.2572  -3.14E-08 0.0278 4.66E-06 
  (0.0284) (0.0069) (0.0365) (0.0093) (0.5153)  (3.26E-07) (0.0214)  (8.16E-06)
Dummy No R&D  -0.0015  -0.0033  -0.0050  -0.0040      0.0025  -1.65E-06 
  (0.0083) (0.0024) (0.0104) (0.0033)      (0.0068)  (1.53E-06)
Citation-wtd Patent Stock (ln)  0.0021*  0.0002  0.0017**  0.0003  0.0003  -5.25E-09  0.0019*  3.71E-08 
  (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0058)  (7.30E-09) (0.0004)  (1.20E-07)
Citation-wtd  Patent-intensity  -0.0386* -0.0021 -0.0466* -0.0033  0.2957 -1.26E-06  -0.0074 1.11E-06 
  (0.0161)  (0.0063) (0.02) (0.0088)  (0.5618)  (1.99E-06) (0.0092)  (1.47E-06)
Dummy Zero Cit.-wtd Patent-  -0.0159*  -0.0019  -0.0194*  -0.0012  -0.0511  -1.29E-07* 0.0000  -1.48E-06 
intensity  (0.0052) (0.0017) (0.0069) (0.0024) (0.0465)  (4.68E-08) (0.003)  (9.27E-07)
Country  dummies  Yes  No  No  Yes  
Industry  &  Year  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No  of  Observations  20,940  15,766   687    4,487   
No  of  Acquisitions  5,065    4,384   300  381  
Chi-squared  1,462.8  1,191.8  1,400.0  1,001.2  
Degrees  of  Freedom  80  62  55  76  
P-value  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Log  Likelihood  -8,546.5  -7,279.0   -331.4    -817.0   
Pseudo  R-squared  0.18  0.15  0.24  0.27  
(1) refers to the probability of acquiring non-public targets only, (2) refers to the probability of acquiring at least one public target.  “Other” 
regression includes firms from Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland.  The base industry is SIC 283 and 
the base year is 1998.  In the first two columns the base country is the US, and in the last two columns it is Canada.  See notes to Table 2, Panel A. 
 
Table 3 also reports the results from estimating the regressions after splitting 
firms into three geographical regions, the US, the UK and Other.  As expected 
since more than four-fifths of firm-year observations involve US firms, the full 
sample results mainly reflect relationships that hold for US firms.  In fact, the 
remarks made above apply with almost no exception to the US firms.   Despite 
some differences, the financial profile of acquiring firms from the UK and 
“Other” countries in general accords with the above findings.  However, the 
innovation-related characteristics of both groups of acquirers are not particularly   24
different from those of non-acquiring firms.  The only statistically significant 
coefficients are those of the stock of accumulated knowledge for acquiring firms 
from “Other” countries of non-public targets, and of the dummy for zero 
citation-weighted patent-intensity for UK firms acquiring public targets.
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We use a likelihood ratio test to test for coefficient equality for all the 
innovation-related variables between the two most heavily populated national 
groups of firms, namely the US and the UK.  We find that the hypothesis of 
coefficient equality can be rejected only at a 10% level (p-value=0.07).  The 
insignificant coefficients of the innovation-related variables for non-US firms do 
not necessarily have a zero effect on the acquisition probability, but their 
estimated values are likely to reflect relatively smaller sample sizes that produce 
statistically insignificant results. The results as a whole provide evidence to 
support the view that only US firms acquiring non-public targets have a 
distinctly different innovative profile from non-acquiring firms.
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Sensitivity checks  
To check for the possibility that some kind of omitted variable bias has affected 
our results by estimating two complementary specifications, we estimate a 
specification for a sub-sample of 15,652 observations on 1,778 firms and 3,956 
acquisitions by 835 acquiring firms where data on all financial, R&D and 
citation-weighted patent-related variables are available.  The results presented in 
the first two columns of Table 4 are very similar to those presented in Table 3.  
The only differences are that for firms acquiring non-public targets we now find 
a significantly negative coefficient of liquidity at 10% significance level, and the 
coefficient of the dummy for zero citation-weighted patent-intensity becomes 
insignificant, although it is still negative.  We also re-estimate the same 
specification but this time without normalizing R&D-intensity to zero when 
R&D expenditure is missing (the last two columns of Table 4).  The results are 
similar to those obtained with the normalized R&D-intensity.  Therefore, our 
results seem to be quite robust to variables omitted and to the R&D 
normalization adopted.    25
Table 4. Sensitivity checks: The probability of making acquisitions 
 
 
Multinomial logit regressions 
(marginal effects). 
All independent variables 
Multinomial logit regressions 
(marginal effects). 
Observations with R&D data 
Regressor (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Constant -0.3578*  -0.1121*  -0.3558*  -0.1150* 
 (0.0342)  (0.0107)  (0.0346)  (0.0111) 
Total Assets (ln)  0.0221*  0.0063*  0.0216*  0.0066* 
 (0.0022)  (0.0006)  (0.0022)  (0.0007) 
Total Assets Growth  0.0041*  0.0009**  0.0033**  0.0004 
 (0.0018)  (0.0005)  (0.0018)  (0.0005) 
Op. Return   0.0762*  0.0166*  0.0704*  0.0148* 
 (0.0192)  (0.0061)  (0.0195)  (0.0061) 
Dummy Op. Return Negative  0.0189  0.0049  0.0183  0.0054 
 (0.0139)  (0.0056)  (0.0143)  (0.0056) 
Tobin's q (ln)  0.0131*  0.0041*  0.0133*  0.0046* 
 (0.005)  (0.0015)  (0.005)  (0.0015) 
Leverage -0.0005  -0.0002  -0.0008  -0.0004 
 (0.001)  (0.0004)  (0.001)  (0.0004) 
Liquidity -0.0012**  0.0001  -0.0009  0.0001 
 (0.0007)  (0.0002)  (0.0007)  (0.0002) 
R&D-intensity -0.1170*  -0.0014  -0.1146*  -0.0009 
 (0.0379)  (0.0081)  (0.0381)  (0.0079) 
Dummy No R&D  0.0063  -0.0016     
 (0.0096)  (0.0029)     
Citation-wtd Patent Stock (ln)  0.0024*  0.0002  0.0026*  0.0001 
 (0.0008)  (0.0002)  (0.0009)  (0.0002) 
Citation-wtd Patent-intensity  -0.0510*  -0.0057  -0.0512*  -0.0039 
 (0.0209)  (0.0086)  (0.0209)  (0.0077) 
Dummy Zero Cit.-wtd Patent-intensity  -0.0103  -0.0016  -0.0082  -0.0014 
 (0.0064)  (0.002)  (0.0067)  (0.002) 
Country, Industry & Year dummies  Yes    Yes   
No of Observations  15,652    14,391   
No of Acquisitions  3,956    3,616   
Wald test         
Chi-squared 1,279.7    1,147.9   
Degrees of Freedom  86    84   
P-value 0.0    0.0   
Log Likelihood  -6,508.4    -5,895.4   
Pseudo R-squared  0.18    0.19   
(1) refers to the probability of acquiring non-public targets only, (2) refers to the probability of acquiring at least one public target.  The 
base country is the US, the base industry is SIC 283 and the base year is 1998.  See notes to Table 2, Panel A.   26
Finally, we investigate the possibility that the results are solely caused by an 
inability to empirically control for the underlying size effect, even after its 
inclusion in the set of regressors.  It could be the case that the negative 
coefficients of R&D-intensity and patent-intensity are actually due to the 
presence of firm size in the denominator of the ratios, given that size and 
acquisition probability are positively related.  For this purpose, we form ten size 
deciles so that the sizes of all firms in a decile are comparable and we re-run the 
multinomial logit regressions within each decile (Table 5).
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Although some result sensitivity emerges across size deciles, the sign pattern of 
the coefficients and their statistical significance are in accordance with our 
previous results.  As far as the probability of acquiring non-public targets only is 
concerned, the coefficient of R&D-intensity continues to be significantly 
negative in three of the nine deciles and has the “correct” sign in 7 out of 9 
deciles, whilst the coefficient of the citation-weighted patent-intensity continues 
to be significantly negative in two deciles and has the “correct” sign in 8 out of 9 
deciles
39.  On the contrary, we find no comparable evidence for the 
corresponding coefficients when the effect on the probability of acquiring at 
least one public target is considered, which should be the case if the negative 
coefficients were merely caused by the higher likelihood of larger firms to act as 
acquirers.  The results also provide some support for the finding that the firms 
acquiring non-public targets are likely to have a large stock of accumulated 
citation-weighted patents, while the results are inconclusive for the firms 




Table 5. Sensitivity checks: Multinomial logit regressions (marginal effects) within deciles formed on firm size 
Regressor  2  3 4  5 6  7  8  9 10 
The probability of acquiring non-public targets only                 
Constant -7.2E-05  -1.9E-02*  6.4E-02  -1.9E-02*  -3.8E-05  -5.9E-02  -5.1E-01*  -9.6E-02  -1.1E+00* 
Total Assets (ln)  -2.9E-05  1.6E-03**  -7.7E-03  1.4E-03* 2.4E-06  4.5E-03  3.6E-02*  5.0E-03 6.4E-02* 
Total  Assets  Growth  7.5E-06  5.0E-05 9.5E-05  1.7E-04**  4.4E-06*  -4.9E-04  7.3E-04 -8.3E-03 2.9E-02 
Op.  Return    2.7E-04*  3.4E-03* 1.8E-02*  3.5E-03* 2.3E-05*  7.8E-03  5.3E-02  7.2E-02*  2.8E-01 
Dummy Op. Return Negative  -1.5E-05  -2.4E-03**  5.0E-03  -2.2E-03      4.9E-02**     
Citation-wtd Patent Stock (ln)  1.5E-06  -1.8E-05  -4.9E-06 3.3E-05  2.3E-07  1.9E-04  1.9E-03  2.5E-03** 7.3E-03** 
R&D-intensity 7.2E-06  -2.7E-03  -1.3E-02  2.3E-03  -6.9E-05*  -4.3E-02*  -8.9E-02  -1.4E-01**  -3.1E-01 
Dummy No R&D  -1.1E-04  -2.5E-04  -5.3E-03  -5.1E-04  4.2E-06  -2.0E-03  3.2E-03  -6.7E-03  -4.8E-02 
Cit.-wtd Patent-intensity  -2.4E-06  -1.2E-03  -4.3E-03  -4.2E-03* -8.9E-06  -2.9E-02  -1.3E-01** -7.0E-02  5.7E-01 
Dummy Zero Cit.-wtd Pat-
intensity 
-4.1E-05  -4.4E-04 -1.5E-03  -4.7E-04  -4.3E-06** -4.1E-04  -3.7E-03 -2.3E-02* -5.3E-02 
The probability of acquiring  at least one public target                 
Constant 2.1E-09  -1.8E-08  -1.3E-08  -7.9E-12  -4.0E-06  -6.7E-11  -4.7E-05  -5.8E-02  -4.2E-01 
Total Assets (ln)  -3.1E-10*  1.2E-09  -4.7E-10  -5.7E-13  1.2E-07  4.3E-12  2.7E-06  2.8E-03  2.2E-02* 
Total Assets Growth  -1.2E-10**  2.5E-11  1.3E-10  -2.7E-13 2.1E-07**  1.9E-13  2.6E-06*  5.1E-03*  2.5E-02 
Op. Return   4.6E-10**  3.5E-09*  6.3E-09  1.8E-11*  1.1E-06  8.4E-12  1.1E-05**  2.0E-02*  1.6E-01* 
Dummy Op. Return Negative  -3.8E-10  5.9E-10  1.7E-10  6.9E-12      -1.5E-04*     
Citation-wtd Patent Stock (ln)  2.1E-11*  -1.7E-11  -8.5E-10*  7.3E-14  7.1E-08**  -2.0E-13  9.3E-08  4.1E-04  2.2E-03 
R&D-intensity 4.3E-11  1.0E-09  -6.4E-09  -3.2E-12  -4.2E-06  -9.7E-12  1.4E-05  7.9E-03  7.8E-03 
Dummy No R&D  -2.6E-11  3.7E-10  -2.3E-07*  1.8E-12  -8.1E-07**  2.0E-13  3.3E-06  2.5E-04  -3.8E-02** 
Cit.-wtd Patent-intensity  2.4E-10  9.6E-10  -9.6E-09  9.7E-12**  -3.2E-06  -4.2E-11  -1.6E-05  4.3E-03  9.0E-02 
Dummy Zero Cit.-wtd Pat-
intensity 
3.5E-10 -1.6E-10  -4.4E-09  -8.1E-13  5.6E-08  -3.1E-12 -1.9E-06 6.3E-04  -1.7E-02 
Country, Industry & Year 
Dummies 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  2094  2094  2094  2094  2094  2094  2141  2088  2053 
No of Acquisitions  163  237  341  414  469  455  566  818  1525 
Pseudo R2  0.14  0.12  0.12  0.13  0.19  0.22  0.25  0.20  0.17 
The base industry is SIC 283, the base year is 1998 and the base country is the US.  See notes to Table 2, Panel A.  The ten deciles are formed on the basis of firm size (Total Assets).  Firm size is increasing in successive 
deciles.  The regression coefficients for firm-year observations in the first decile could not be estimated because the covariance matrix is not positive definite.   See notes to Table 2, Panel A.   28
DISCUSSION 
 
Let us summarize the main results from the analysis.  Acquiring firms, in 
general, tend to be relatively larger, more dynamic and somewhat more 
profitable firms and they tend to have better growth prospects compared with 
non-acquiring firms.  Although our initial analysis suggested that acquiring 
firms as a whole also tend to have a significantly different innovative profile 
from that of non-acquiring firms, it turned out when we split the sample 
accordingly that it is only the firms acquiring non-public targets (mainly private 
firms and subsidiaries) that do so.  In particular, firms acquiring non-public 
targets have a significantly larger stock of citation-weighted patents, a lower 
R&D-intensity and, although they are more likely to have some R&D output, 
they tend to have a relatively lower citation-weighted patent-intensity.   
Accounting for firm size and R&D-intensity, we interpret this finding as an 
indication of some type of low R&D productivity of acquiring firms before they 
acquire non-public targets.  These results hold mainly for US acquiring firms, 
which, however, account for the vast proportion of sample acquiring firms.   
 
We conjecture that the inability to identify firms acquiring public targets on the 
basis of their innovation-related characteristics is due to the greater complexity 
of factors affecting large acquisitions which include multiple attempts, such as 
to rationalize costs and increase market power, which are not primarily relevant 
in relation to the much more numerous acquisitions of non-public targets.  
 
The findings about the specific innovation-related characteristics of firms 
acquiring private targets and former subsidiaries have various implications for 
the hypotheses about the rationale of acquisitions set out in our theoretical 
section.  The finding that the likelihood of becoming an acquirer is higher the 
lower the R&D output as proxied by the citation-weighted patent-intensity, after 
controlling for R&D-intensity, is in accordance with Hypothesis 1.  We interpret 
this as suggesting that there exists an enhanced desire to acquire new technology 
and innovation-related assets driven by declining returns from the exploitation 
of the firms’ existing knowledge base.  This finding is along the same line as the 
conceptual argument supported by Vermeulen and Barkema (2001), Capron and 
Mitchell (1998) and others that acquisitions can be employed as a means of 
revitalizing a firm and enhancing its knowledge base. 
 
We find supportive evidence for Hypothesis 2 which claims that, in accordance 
with the make-or-buy theory, internal R&D is an alternative to external 
acquisition of technology by takeover.  Indeed, firms acquiring non-public 
targets tend to have significantly lower R&D-intensity, and this result was   29
robust to alternative specifications and samples employed.  Our finding that the 
make-or-buy theory seems to hold for US firms acquiring non-public targets is 
seemingly in agreement with Blonigen and Taylor (2000) who employ a sample 
of 531 acquisitions by US electronic and electrical equipment firms during the 
period 1985-93.  However, the results from our analysis suggest that this 
hypothesis does not hold for acquirers of public targets.  Therefore, we believe 
that Blonigen and Taylor’s analysis
40 is likely to be subject to some sort of 
aggregation bias by not discriminating between acquisitions of public and non-
public targets.  As far as the “normal” R&D-intensity found for acquirers of 
public targets is concerned, it contradicts Hall’s (1999) finding, based on a 
sample of 861 US manufacturing acquisitions from 1976 to 1995, that acquirers 
tend to have a low R&D-intensity.  We suspect that the reason for this difference 
is that her sample extends across all the manufacturing industries, including the 
non-high-tech ones. 
 
We also find evidence in favor of Hypothesis 3 that, controlling for current 
R&D, acquiring firms will tend to have a relatively large stock of accumulated 
knowledge generated by past R&D efforts.  Therefore, the evidence seems to be 
in agreement with the theoretical argument that a large stock of accumulated 
knowledge is essential if the acquirer is to have the necessary absorptive 
capacity to identify the appropriate target and to fully exploit its innovative 
potential (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Chesbrough, 2003).   
 
In effect we argue that smaller acquisitions are part of an innovation strategy for 
firms with relatively low levels of internal R&D which seek to offset low 
productivity in exploiting past R&D efforts by exploring a range of potential 
future innovation trajectories in new and smaller business units.  Interestingly, 
these findings are broadly consistent with some of the findings of a number of 
empirical studies on the relationship between firm size and innovative activity.
41  
Despite differences in measurement and methodology and disagreements in 
explanation, the very largest firms are often argued to have a lower R&D-
intensity and R&D productivity than that of their large but somewhat smaller 
rivals, while the research conducted in most large industrial laboratories is found 
to generate predominantly minor improvement inventions rather than major new 
inventions.   
 
Finally, the fact that only the acquirers of non-public targets that are 
incorporated in the US exhibit these distinctive innovative characteristics 
(particularly the low R&D-intensity) is interesting but hard to explain within the 
framework of this study.  We suggest the possibility that the relatively large and 
long-established firms in the US have access to a relatively more developed 
market of high-tech start-ups and spin-offs which supplements other forms of   30
technology markets and that they tend to adjust their R&D strategy accordingly.  
This view is in accordance with Williamson’s (1975) systems approach to the 
innovation process, and of more recent explanations of “open innovation” 
strategies suggested by Chesbroough (2003) or the mechanism of trading 
technology through the trading of small firms described by Granstrand and 
Sjolander (1990) and others. 
 
Although this study, focusing on the acquirers’ side, provides support to the 
view that acquisitions are employed as an alternative to internal R&D activity in 
certain occasions, it also calls for further work on the supply side of the 
acquisition phenomenon.  Uncovering the innovative characteristics of the firms 
acquired will enable a more comprehensive understanding of the role that 




In this paper we investigate the incidence of high technology acquisitions using 
a unique dataset covering a maximum of 9,744 acquisitions of mainly public and 
private targets and former subsidiaries by high technology public firms in all the 
major industrial economies during the period from 1984 to 2001.   Controlling 
for a full range of financial variables linked to the propensity to acquire, we 
develop alternative theories of the determinants of becoming an acquirer 
focusing in particular upon the impact of R&D-intensity as a proxy for R&D 
inputs, the citation-weighted patent-intensity as a proxy for R&D output and the 
stock of citation-weighted patents as a proxy for the accumulated stock of 
knowledge generated by past R&D efforts.  
 
Our analysis shows that only the firms acquiring relatively small private targets 
and former subsidiaries (cf. acquirers of public targets) have a significantly 
different innovative profile compared with non-acquiring firms.  The following 
conclusions can be drawn with respect to this type of acquisitions.  First, we find 
support for the view that the propensity to acquire new knowledge-related assets 
through acquisitions is driven by declining returns from the on-going 
exploitation of a firm’s existing knowledge base.  Second, we find strong 
evidence in favor of the make-or-buy theory that acquisitions are employed by 
high technology firms as a means of sourcing knowledge externally as a 
substitute to in-house R&D activity.  Third, our results are in accordance with 
the theoretical argument that a large stock of accumulated knowledge is 
essential if the acquirer is to have the necessary absorptive capacity to identify 
the appropriate target and to fully exploit its innovative potential.   
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These results suggest that smaller acquisitions can be seen as part of an 
innovation strategy for firms with relatively low levels of internal R&D which 
seek to offset low productivity in exploiting past R&D efforts by exploring a 
range of potential future innovation trajectories in new and smaller business 




1 High technology industries are identified according to the classification 
suggested by Hall (1994), Chandler (1994) and Hall and Vopel (1996) on the 
basis of the industries’ research-intensity and an informal assessment of those 
that are likely to have long horizons for project development and those that can 
move faster.  Therefore, the high technology industries include Electronic 
Instruments & Communication Equipment, Biopharmaceuticals, Electrical 
Machinery, Computers & Computer Equipment, Transportation Equipment, 
Optical, Medical & Measuring Instruments. 
2 Strictly speaking, patents reflect inventions, i.e. “an idea, a sketch or a model 
for a new improved device, product, process, or system” rather than innovations, 
where an innovation “is accomplished only with the first commercial transaction 
involving the new product, process, system or device” (Freeman, 1982).  
However, because patents are found to be correlated with innovations (Comanor 
and Scherer, 1969; Griliches, 1990), they can be used as proxies for innovative 
activity. 
3 The 9,744 acquisitions involve 1,398 (14.3%) publicly traded firms, 4,850 
(49.8%) privately held firms, 3,363 (34.5%) former subsidiary units, and 133 
(1.4%) units that are reported by Thomson Financial’s SDC either as joint 
ventures or their public status is unknown. 
4 Values are reported in 1996 constant prices using the US GDP deflator. 
5 This is to avoid the inclusion of large conglomerate companies which are 
primarily active in non-high-tech industries with just a tiny proportion of their 
sales in a high-tech industry. 
6 These eight 2-digit SIC codes are the ones defined by Hall and Vopel (1996) as 
high-tech industries with the addition of SIC 73 and 87.  SIC 73 is added to the 
set of high-tech SICs because many of the firms active in 357 Computer And 
Office Equipment are often classified as software companies with primary 
activity in SIC 737 Computer Programming& Data Processing.  SIC 87 is 
added to the set of high-tech SICs, as a large number of the companies selected 
based on Hall and Vopel classification had their primary activity in SIC 873 
Research, Development, And Testing Services.  Notice that “purely” software   32
 
firms are excluded from the sample in the first instance, because intellectual 
property rights tend to be relatively more frequently secured by copyrights 
rather than by patents. 
7 German acquiring firms were initially included in the sample but they were 
eventually dropped because of lack of data (in particular, R&D expenditures 
were missing for the population of German firms). 
8 With 1,947 of these deals involving public targets, while the majority of them 
involves private firms and subsidiary units. 
9 The citations series is subject to some truncation bias, i.e. patents applied for 
closer to the right-end of our dataset will have a smaller “opportunity” to be 
cited in subsequent patents.  To control for this source of bias, citations are 
normalised using the “fixed-effects” approach described in Hall et al. (2001). 
10 Our study is not the first one to employ US patent data for both US and non-
US firms (See Bloom and Van Reenen, 2001; Geroski, Van Reenen and Samiei, 
1996).  Our analysis controls for the possibility of some “home advantage” bias, 
since US firms will tend to have a higher propensity to patent in their home-
country patent office compared to non-US firms (the latter might tend to register 
relatively more important inventions to the USPTO). 
11 These variables include total assets, total asset growth, operating return, 
Tobin’s q, leverage and liquidity. 
12 The main problems are heteroscedastic residuals and predicted probabilities 
often exceeding unity. 
13 Among others, Palepu (1986), Hall (1988, 1999), Powell (1997) employ a 
logit model, while Blonigen and Taylor (2000) employ a negative binomial 
maximum likelihood model. 
14 The independence assumption of acquisitions is often questioned by the 
argument that they tend to be clustered by time, country and industry (Andrade 
and Stafford, 2000).  In that case, the estimated parameters are still consistent 
but their standard errors are incorrect (Poirier and Ruud, 1988).  We adopt a 
remedy which is similar to that suggested by Beck et al. (1997), by adding to the 
set of regressors time, country and industry dummies to account for the 
possibility of time and cross-sectional interdependence.  
15 Some studies calculate R&D-intensity as the ratio of R&D-expenditure to 
sales.  Since we proxy firm size by total assets, we use the same variable in the 
denominator of the ratio for consistency reasons. 
16 We choose to proxy for the stock of accumulated knowledge using the stock 
of (citation-weighted) patents rather than of R&D expenditure, because the   33
 
patent series do not suffer from the time discontinuities present in the R&D 
expenditure series.  
17 This approximation has the advantage over the alternative measures that we 
considered (e.g. Bosworth et al., 2000; Hall, 2000; Blundell et al., 1992) that it 
is easy to calculate and it has better sample coverage than the alternatives.  It has 
shortcomings (Andrade and Stafford (2000)). It assumes that the replacement 
cost of assets and liabilities is well proxied by their book value, it assumes that 
the average and the marginal q are the same, and it ignores tax effects. The 
conceptually correct measure comparing replacement costs to market values 
requires data which is frequently missing in financial datasets, and considerable 
imputation, which made it impractical in this study spanning many countries. 
For a recent discussion of alternative ‘q’ estimators see Lee (1999).   
18 Recall that total assets, Tobin’s q and the stocks of (citation-weighted) patents 
are transformed using the natural logarithm.  The discussion that follows refers 
to the transformed variables. 
19 It is possible that Tobin’s q will tend to be correlated with left out intangibles 
including R&D, so that firms with more R&D or patents will have higher q. 
Given measurement error this implies a downward bias in estimating the 
coefficient on R&D intensity and patent intensity. Estimating our second model 
serves a test for this possible impact by excluding ‘q’. We find little evidence in 
the results below that this downward bias is present. 
20 We are aware, however, that even lagging regressors in a panel dataset does 
not necessarily control for all sources of endogeneity (Wooldridge, 1997).  
Notice that this adjustment implies that comparisons between firms active in 
acquisitions with those not active are drawn with respect to the last pre-merger 
year.  Similar methods have been widely used in the literature (Blonigen and 
Taylor, 2000; Hall, 1999). 
21 Industry groups are defined at the 2-digit SIC level, with the exception of 
firms in SIC 283 which are distinguished from those in SIC 28 (excluding 283), 
since they are likely to have distinct characteristics, such as a significantly 
higher R&D-intensity. 
22 We actually find, based on likelihood ratio tests, that such adjustments 
improve the fit of the models. 
23 We assume that R&D-intensity is immaterial whenever R&D-expenditure is 
not reported but data on most of the economic variables are available.  In the 
analysis that follows, we check for the robustness of our findings to this 
normalisation.   34
 
24 Notice that the patent-based regressions include only firms which have been 
linked to USPTO patent assignees, which may not, however, produce any 
patentable invention in some or all the years. 
25 The likelihood ratio test tests that the proportion of the total variance 
contributed by the panel-level variance component equals zero and hence that 
the panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator. 
26 Statistical significance in the subsequent analysis will be assessed at the 5% or 
10% level. 
27 Yet, again the pooled and the random-effects logit models predict similar 
relationships. 
28 This dummy is equal to unity for about a third of the acquirers. 
29 Only in the simple logit model the coefficient of R&D-intensity remains 
negative and significant. 
30 The effects of the last two years (2001-2) are biased from the fact that our 
acquisition data include (successfully completed) deals announced until June 
2001.   
31 We do not put much weight on the marginal effects of the industrial activity 
for firms primarily active in SIC 28 (excluding 283), 73 and 87, as the estimated 
effects are likely to reflect the selection criteria for acquiring firms described in 
the third Section. 
32 These include mainly privately held firms and subsidiaries, as well as some 
former joint ventures and some firms of which the public status is unknown.  
We have adopted this dichotomous classification of acquisitions into those 
involving public and non-public targets, since this classification captures a 
significant difference: the median acquisition of a public target has almost ten 
times the value of the median acquisition of a non-public target ($133.1 million 
versus $13.6 million).  
33 This group also includes firm-year observations where, apart from 
acquisitions of public firms, possibly non-public targets are acquired.  We 
assume that acquisitions of public targets are likely to dominate in significance 
acquisitions of non-public firms, in the same logic explained in footnote 32.  We 
also discriminated between observations in which the acquiring firm acquires 
public targets only and both public and non-public targets, but we found that 
these two groups of acquiring firms have similar characteristics. 
34 In Panel A (B) there are 1,221 (567) observations where firms acquire at least 
one public target, and 4,703 (2,592) observations where firms acquire non-
public targets only.   35
 
35 For acquirers of public targets, we get an insignificantly positive coefficient of 
operating return in Panel A, but a significantly positive one in Panel B. 
36 The statistically significant dummy for missing R&D in the UK regression for 
the probability of acquiring public targets in Panel A, which equals unity for 
only 1% of UK acquiring firms, becomes insignificant in Panel B. 
37 Possible explanations behind the difference between US and non-US 
acquiring firms are discussed in the discussion section. 
38 Results are reported for all, but the smallest size decile for which the 
regression coefficients could not be estimated because the covariance matrix is 
not positive definite.  The loss in information content is small since firms in that 
decile make only 77 of the 5,065 acquisitions. 
39 If there was no relation between the variables we might expect an equally 
number of positive and negative coefficients across deciles. A binomial 
probability test reveals that we can reject the hypothesis of no relation at the 5% 
level when 8 out of 9 signs are the same. 
40 Their sample includes acquisitions which are part of our sample, and we find 
that our results continue to hold for the subsample of US firms active in 
electronic and electrical equipment. 
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The logit model 
Assume that the probability, Pit, for firm i to belong to a binary outcome y 
(y=0,1), here to make acquisitions in year t, can be written as a logit function of 
some vector of various firm characteristics included in matrix X, with i=1,…,N, 



















where  β is a vector of parameters to be estimated and νi is a firm-specific 
residual constant across time.  The maximum likelihood estimates are derived by 
maximizing the log-likelihood function with respect to the unknown parameters 
(See Wooldridge 2002, Chapter 15, p. 483).  A positive sign on a parameter 
indicates that an increase in the corresponding variable increases the likelihood 
of a takeover, and vice versa. 
 
The negative binomial maximum likelihood model 
Let yit be the number of acquisitions firm i makes during year t.  We assume that 
yit is distributed as Poisson(γit), which seems a natural first assumption for many 
counting problems in econometrics (See Hausman et al., 1984).  The Poisson 
parameter  γit follows a Gamma distribution with shape parameters (λit,1/δi), 
where λit is parameterized as  ( ) 1 ' exp − = it it X β λ  and δi is the dispersion parameter.  
For the random-effects estimator we assume that the dispersion is the same for 
all elements in the same firm (1+δi) but δi varies randomly from firm to firm, 
and that 1/(1+δi) is distributed as a Beta random variable with shape parameters 
(r,s), where r and s need to be estimated in addition to the vector of parameters 









i it it y
y
























| Pr  
 
 
Then, the joint probability for counts and the consequent log-likelihood function 
are derived, with the latter being estimated using standard maximum likelihood 
techniques (See Hausman et al., 1984). 
 